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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Manivest does not intend to reply to each and every
argument in the Howes' brief, since most of those arguments are
adequately addressed in Manivest's opening brief.

Instead,

Manivest will focus on those core issues that are at the heart
of this case.
At page 32 of their brief, the Howes state:
lawsuit is not about rent.
of agreements."

"This

It is about fairness and observance

The Howes are only half right.

From

Manivest's standpoint, the lawsuit is about fairness. However,
it is clear from the record and from their own brief that, from
the Howes' standpoint, this lawsuit is about their dissatisfaction with the amount of the rent fixed by the lease.
The Howes' crusade to extricate themselves from the
lease has featured strategies that scorn the Howes' claim to
fairness.

In order to break the lease, the Howes have

attempted to find lease defaults that could not be cured.

The

Howes relied upon alleged defaults that were never the subject
of any notice to the Howes, which, of course, gave Manivest no
opportunity to cure those alleged defaults.

They relied upon

alleged defaults that either occurred after the lease was
already purportedly terminated, or were first raised after
termination, and thus could not have been a basis for
termination.

They also relied upon alleged defaults that were

not defaults, or that had been cured either before the Howes
became aware of them, or before trial.

Nonetheless, all of

these same alleged defaults also formed the basis for the trial

court's ultimate decision allowing forfeiture.

Now, in their

brief on this appeal, the Howes rely upon a lease provision
prohibiting assignments for the benefit of creditors, even
though this provision was not relied upon below.—/
Principles of fairness that find expression in Utah
law will not sanction forfeiture in these circumstances.

This

Court has held that even absent express contractual language
requiring notice of default and opportunity to cure, they are
required as a condition precedent to forfeiture.

Thus, even

assuming that the standard of review is "manifest injustice,"
such an injustice has occurred here.
The Howes base their claim to attorneys' fees and
costs upon the lease language.
attorneys' fees as costs.

However, the lease defines

Under Rule 54(d)(2), Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure, the Howes' application for attorneys' fees and
other costs was submitted too late to be considered by the
trial court.

The Howes' contention that the attorneys' fees

award should be affirmed, even if judgment on the merits is
reversed, is another example of their overreaching.
As to the Howes' cross appeal, they argue that the
lease requires Manivest to spend hundreds of thousands of
dollars to improve the leased property, while at the same time
arguing that the leasehold cannot be used to secure the
financing needed for such improvements.

1/

Moreover, even if the

The only reference to this provision was on pp. 5-6 of
the Howes' trial brief (R. 435), which was submitted at
the close of the evidence in lieu of oral argument, and
to which Manivest had no opportunity to respond.

trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence related to the
maintenance issue, which Manivest disputes, at most the Howes
are entitled to a new trial.

Manivest does not dispute the

need for a new trial, given the taint created by the trial
court's errors.
ARGUMENT
I.
CLEAR WRITTEN NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO CURE
WERE REQUIRED AS TO EACH ALLEGED DEFAULT THAT
FORMED THE BASIS FOR LEASE FORFEITURE
At page 9 of their brief the Howes argue that the
lease did not require written notice of default.

See also,

Verified Complaint, 1[ 29 (Add No. 2 to Manivest's opening
brief.)

Nonetheless, they also argue that they gave Manivest

adequate written notice of the alleged defaults and an
opportunity to cure.

There is no merit to these arguments.

In Hansen v. Christensen, 545 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1976),
the seller under an installment contract for the sale of real
property (which is not dissimilar to a 50 year ground lease)
contended that the buyer's interest had been forfeited, even
though no written notice of default or opportunity to cure had
been given.

Unlike the standard Uniform Real Estate Contract,

and Like paragraph 9 of the lease at issue here (Add No. 1 to
Manivest's opening brief), the contract in Hansen did not
require notice of default or opportunity to cure.

Instead, the

contract "provided that after the continuance of a default for
ninety days the seller had a right to exercise three options"
(i.e. foreclosure, forfeiture, or other legal remedy).
1154.

Id. at

Nonetheless, this Court held that these contractual
provisions "are not self executing.

They require some

affirmative act on the part of the seller."

The Court also

held that mere notice of termination, without opportunity to
cure, was not enough\—/\
[T]he seller must give the defaulting buyer
a reasonable time within which to cure the
default. Without this notice the defaulting
buyer would not know what to do. He would
not have certain knowledge his tenancy was
at an end. He could assume that the seller
may have waived default, or would elect to
enforce the contract rather than forfeit it;
or he could assume he would be permitted to
perform."
(Id.

Footnote omitted.)±/
Hansen applies here, even in the face of paragraph 9

of the lease, which states that in the event the lessees "fail

2/

In Johnston v. Austin, 748 P.2d 1084 (Utah 1988), this
Court held that where the seller chooses the remedy of
acceleration of the contract rather than forfeitures,
notice of default and an opportunity to cure are not
necessary unless required by the contract. To that
extent only, the Court overruled Hansen. However, the
Court reaffirmed Hansen, as applied to contractual
forfeitures: "Forfeiture is a harsh remedy, and a seller
must therefore give a buyer notice of default and a
reasonable period of time in which to cure the default
before exercising a forfeiture provision." 748 P.2d
1086-1087 (citations omitted). That this requirement
applies regardless of the contractual provisions is shown
by the next sentence of the Court's opinion: "In fact,
written notice of default is expressly required by . . .
the contract." I_d. at 1087.

3/

See Also, Restatement of the Law (Second) Property 2d
Landlord and Tenant, Vol 1, § 13.1, comment h. at p. 389
(1976):
The landlord may hold the tenant in default,
under the rule of this section, for the tenant's
failure to perform a promise contained in the
(Footnote continued on next page)

to keep any covenant herein contained to be performed by
Lessees, or within sixty (60) days thereafter, then in that
event, without notice from the Lessors, this Agreement shall
cease and terminate...."
First, this provision is not self-executing, even
though forfeiture is the only remedy expressly provided.

As

suggested in Hansen, the lessors could waive the default, or
they could elect to affirm rather than forfeit the contract and
sue for damages, specific performance or some other remedy, or
they could allow the lessees to cure.17
Second, the fact that the Howes did give notices of
default and of forfeiture either evidences their belief that
paragraph 9 was not self-executing, or constitutes a waiver or
estoppel as to any claim that it was self-executing.
Third, the requirement of notice in Hansen is not
simply to inform the lessee which remedy the lessor has elected
to invoke upon the lessee's default.

The notice mandated by

Hansen is a product of simple fairness, by giving the lessee
facing forfeiture "a reasonable time within which to cure the
default".

Hansen at 545 P.2d 1154. Under Hansen, opportunity

(Footnote continued from previous page)
lease only if the landlord has requested the
tenant to perform and given him a reasonable
opportunity to do so.
4_/

Also, paragraph 11 of the lease, now also relied upon by
the Howes in their brief, is expressly not
self-executing. Paragraph 11 provides that in the event
of lessees' assignment for the benefit of creditors, "the
Lessor may terminate this Lease . . . " (Emphasis
added.) As in Hansen, forfeiture is optional, not
automatic.

to cure is required regardless of which remedies are otherwise
available, even the remedy of a "self-executing" forfeiture.
Attached as Addenda "A", "B" and M C M hereto (Trial Ex.
30, and 31) are copies of the three notices (dated March 30,
1988, April 29, 1988 and May 31, 1988) offered up by the Howes
to justify forfeiture of Manivest's leasehold.

The only

defaults complained of in these notices are the December 1987 January 1988 lease pledges to Valley Bank as security for
financing, and "piles of Christmas-time trash and last year's
crop of obnoxious weeds . . . and . . . the surface of the
parking lot is not and for some period of time has not been in
good order or repair . . .".

(Add. "A", p. 2).

Nonetheless, at trial the Howes summoned up a host of
other alleged defaults that were never the subject of any
notice of default prior to termination.

These same alleged

defaults also found their way into the trial court's Findings
of Fact (Add. No. 4 to Manivest's opening brief) and were the
foundation for the trial court's imposition of the harsh
judgment of forfeiture.

These "notice-less" alleged defaults

included:
1.

Purported encroachments in 1983 (Trial Ex.

10, Finding No. 5);
2.

A May, 1978 pledge of the lease to First

Security Bank as security for financing (Trial Ex. 11, Finding
No. 6), which was subsequently released (Tr. 253, 254);
3.

A pledge of the lease to Valley Bank as

security for financing in 1982 (Trial Ex. 12-14, Finding No.
7), which also was subsequently released (Tr. 254);

4.

Lease assignments between Manivest

controlled entities in 1976 and 1978 (Trial Ex. 22, Finding No.
19);
5.

A purported assignment to the Manivest

Liquidating Trust on April 28, 1988 (Trial Ex. 21, 40, Finding
No. 20);
6.

Alleged violations of Murray City ordinances

in 1983, and in 1989 after the lease had already been
purportedly terminated (Trial Ex. 23, 26, 28, 37, Findings No.
21, 22);
7.

Alleged health and safety violations ob-

served in 1989 or 1990, again long after the lease had purportedly been terminated (Trial Ex. 39, Tr. 168, Finding No. 23);
8.

Underground Storage Tanks (Finding No. 24).

The Howes* brief bristles with contentions that
Manivest enjoyed "grace periods" (p. 45) and the opportunity to
cure these defaults.

This assertion is belied not only by the

Howes' failure to give notice of the alleged defaults
enumerated above, but also by the content of the notices they
did give.
Where is the "grace period" in the Howes' initial
notice of March 30, 1988?

That notice simply stated: "Based

upon these defaults, it is our position that we are entitled to
terminate Manivest's rights under the Lease" (Add. "A", p. 2 ) .
The Howes' April 29, 1988, notice demanded performance 17 but

5_/

However, the April 29 notice addressed only the lease
pledge to Valley Bank, not the allegations regarding
weeds, debris and potholes in the parking lot.

did not specify what the purported "grace period" was: "On
behalf of the lessors, I hereby advise you that time is of the
essense [sic] and that we insist upon strict performance . . ."
(Add. "B", p. 2 ) ,
Other than indicating that time was of the essence,
this second purported notice gave no inkling of the period in
which cure was expected.

Was it 60 days, as one might infer

from paragraph 9 of the lease, or a longer or shorter period?
Did the period begin to run from April 29, 1988, when
performance was first demanded, or from March 30, 1988 when the
Howes attempted to terminate the lease without giving any
opportunity to perform?

The third notice dated May 31, 1988

(Add. "C"), purported to terminate the lease effective upon
receipt of the notice, even though it was sent only 32 days
after the April 29 notice first requesting performance,^
Thus, even the notices of default that the Howes did
give were too "indefinite or uncertain" to sustain a
forfeiture.
P.2d

First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Maxwell, 659

1078, 1081 (Utah 1983).

Also, forfeiture is permitted

only where the agreement itself has "clear and unequivocal
terms."

I_d.

Here, even if the Howes* tortured interpretations

of the lease were correct, it suffers from "ambiguity or lack

£/

The Howes also argue that Manivest was remiss in failing
to cure even after the date upon which its interest in
the lease was forfeited, which the trial court found to
be June 1, 1988 (Conclusion No. 8). However, based upon
this finding, Manivest no longer owed the Howes any
contractual duties after that date.

of clarity" fatal to a claim for forfeiture, because it failed
to provide Manivest adequate notice of what was required in
order to avoid forfeiture.-1'

Id.

It is no answer for the Howes to argue that Manivest
was put on notice of the newly alleged defaults by inclusion of
some documents on a pre-trial exhibit list, or that Manivest
was required to send out interrogatories to ferret out
allegations of default not contained in any notice, or even the
Complaint.

By this time Manivest1s leasehold interest had

already been forfeited, at least according to the trial court.
Moreover, Hansen and Maxwell establish that it is the duty of
the party seeking forfeiture to provide adequate notice of
default, not the burden of the party against whom forfeiture is
sought to play a guessing game.

In short, allegations of

default, even if proven to be true, will not support the harsh
remedy of forfeiture, if not included in a notice of default.
Reeploeg v. Jensen, 490 P.2d 445, 447 (Wash. App. 1971), rev'd
on other grounds 503 P.2d 99 (Wash. 1972), cert. den. 414 U.S.
839 (1973); Tower v. Halderman, 782 P.2d 719, 720-721 (Ariz.
App. 1989).

2/

Another example of this ambiguity is the 60-day period
referenced in paragraph 9. When does this period begin
to run? Is some notice required to start the period,
even though that same paragraph purports to eliminate any
notice requirement? Can the lessor secretly observe a
default on day one, hope the lessee doesn't discover or
cure the default, and then declare a forfeiture on day 61
as a "gotcha"? To permit such a result is to forsake
fairness and to ignore the drastic consequences of
forfeiture.

Manivest argued the notice issues at trial in the
context of its objections, on grounds of surprise, to the
Howes' eleventh-hour default allegations.

(Tr. 44-52, 96,)

Because these allegations did not appear in any pleading filed
by the Howes before trial, and because the trial court abused
its discretion in denying Manivest1s motion to adjourn the
trial to permit Manivest to prepare a defense to the new
claims, Manivest had no opportunity to raise the notice defects
in any other context.
In any event, the trial court committed plain error in
premising the forfeiture on the belated default allegations.
Accordingly, the Judgment of Forfeiture and Order of Possession
must be reversed, and the lease must be reinstated and
possession returned to Manivest.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT'S FORFEITURE OF THE LEASE
WAS MANIFESTLY UNJUST.
Forfeiture here was manifestly unjust not only because
of the absence of notice and opportunity to cure, but also
because it was based upon assignments that did not violate the
lease, and upon technical, non-material defaults.
A.

Manivest Did Not Violate any Prohibitions Against
Assignment of the Lease or Covenants Against
Encumbrance of the "Demised Premises".

The Howes concede that Manivest's assignments as
security for financing did not violate the prohibition against
lease assignments in paragraph 4 of the lease.

Instead, they

continue to argue that these assignments breached the covenant
in paragraph 6 against encumbering the "demised premises".

However, if the Howes (or their predecessors-in-interest)
intended to prevent the lessors from using the value of the
leasehold to secure financing, it was incumbent on the Howes to
clearly articulate this prohibition in the lease.

General

restraints on lease assignments or encumbrances, which do not
unambiguously apply to pledges of the leasehold for security,
do not suffice, particularly when the consequence of a
transgression is forfeiture.
At page 43 of their brief, the Howes rely on R.
Powell's treatise on real property for an expansive definition
of the word "encumbrance".

However, the Howes overlook

Professor Powell's comments which bear most directly on the
facts here:
Modern courts almost universally adopt the
view that restrictions on the tenant's right
to transfer are to be strictly construed.
Thus it has been held that lease provisions
prohibiting 'assignments' were not violated
by . . . mortgaging the lease term; by sale
of the controlling stock in the tenant
corporation or change in the personnel of
the tenant partnership . . .
R. Powell, The Law of Real Property Volume 2, 1[ 248[1] at pp.
17-43, 17-44 (1991 ed. ) (footnotes omitted).

See also,

Restatement of the Law (Second) Property 2d Landlord & Tenant,
Vol. 2, § 15.2, comment e., at p. 102 (1976) and illustrations
thereto.

Powell similarly states:
A lease, which creates a present possessory
interest in the tenant, is an entirely
separate interest from the landlord's future
reversionary interest in the property.
Thus, the tenant in the absence of a
covenant in the lease or a statutory
restriction, has the right to mortgage his
interest in the property separately.

R. Powell, supra, If 258[1], p. 17A-57 (footnote omitted).

The covenant against encumbrances of the "demised
premises" in paragraph 6 fails to differentiate between the
lessor's interest in those premises and the lessee's interest,
and thus cannot be construed as prohibiting mortgages of only
the lessee's interest under the rule of strict construction
suggested by Powell.
At page 36 of their brief, the Howes argue that
paragraph 6 was designed to protect their presumed right to
collect rentals from Manivest subtenants in the event
Manivest's interest was terminated.

However, the Howes had no

such right because they had no privity of contract with the
subtenants.

R. Powell, supra, at If 248[1], p. 17-39.

See

also, the portion of paragraph 4 of the lease prohibiting any
subleases from binding the Howes.

Instead, termination of the

Manivest lease would terminate the subleases and any
assignments thereof.

Accordingly, Manivest's pledges of its

leasehold interest or subleases could not jeopardize any
"right" of the Howes, whether at law or reserved by the lease.
Nor did the assignments among the Manivest controlled
entities violate paragraph 4 of the lease.

The Howes* attempts

to distinguish Prince v. Elm Inv. Co., Inc. 649 P.2d 820 (Utah
1982) because it involved a tenant's right of first refusal are
to no avail.

The relevant issue both in Elm and here was

whether a stranger has been inserted into the transaction.

The

fact that the Elm plaintiff sought to enforce a right of first
refusal rather than compel a forfeiture does not diminish Elm's
precedential value.

Under the principles of Elm (at pp.

822-823), limited partnerships that have the same general

partner, or wholly owned corporate subsidiaries, are not
"strangers" to the transaction, contrary to the Howes' argument
at p. 32 of their brief.-x

The quotes from Powell above

suggest that, if anything, the principles of Elm apply with
even greater force to the issue of who is a stranger to the
lease for purposes of construing a prohibition on lease
assignments.
Also, the testimony of Larry Leeper or Swen Mortenson
about their understanding of the relationship between Manivest
and the Manivest Liquidating Trust, or about their relationship
with the two entities, could not change the clear language of
the trust document.

That language provides that the lease at

issue here was excluded from the assets transferred to the
trust, and was retained by Manivest.

(Manivest Liquidating

Trust and Workout Plan, Note 1 to the Balance Sheet of
Diversified Realty, Ltd., Trial Ex. 22, 40). Accordingly,
there was no assignment in violation of either paragraph 4 or
paragraph 11 of the lease.
B.

The Forfeiture of the Lease Constituted
A Windfall to the Howes.

In addition to the "assignments" discussed above,
Manivest also disputes the Howes' other allegations of default,

8^/

The Howes acknowledged as much here, by suing not
National Realty, Ltd., the limited partnership that was
the named successor tenant on the lease, but its general
partner Manivest, which was also the general partner of
the assignee limited partnerships (Tr. 262), and the
parent of the wholly-owned subsidiary assignee, Westco
Realty, Inc. (Trial Ex. 40, p. 2).

as set forth in Manivest's opening brief.-1' Manivest will
not restate those arguments here.

Instead, Manivest will

revisit the issue of materiality, specifically the trial
court's failure to properly consider and apply standards for
assessing the materiality of Manivest's alleged defaults.
Among other things, the trial court failed to put the
effect of the forfeiture into context.

At the time of trial,

the parties were 30 years into a 50-year ground lease. What
was a weed patch when the lease was consummated in 1960, had
become a thriving shopping center—a transformaton achieved
solely through the efforts and dollars of Manivest and its
predecessors-in-interest.

The Howes argue that the $2,000,000

in tenant improvements (Trial Ex. 47) should be ignored.

This

is easy for them to argue, since they invested not one penny
towards those improvements .J-£/
The value of the improvements is relevant not in
determining the value of the leasehold that Manivest stood to

9/

At page 23 of their brief, the Howes state: "Notably,
Manivest does not contest the fact of default." This is
patently false, since Manivest has contested the default
allegations at every stage of these proceedings,
including this appeal.

10/

Perhaps this fact also explains the relatively low fixed
rental. Moreover, the reason the parties agreed upon a
50-year lease term was to encourage the magnitude of
tenant investment in improvements that only such a term
would justify. The Howes reneged on that agreement,
when, slightly over midway through the lease period, they
began to look for any excuse to forfeit the lease.

lose through f orf eiture,J-J-/ but in measuring what the Howes
stood to gain.

The trial court improperly disregarded the size

of the windfall to be bestowed on the Howes in evaluating
whether Manivest's conduct merited forfeiture.
The Howes' windfall may actually be somewhat less than
$2,000,000, since, in any event, the Howes would have acquired
the improvements in the year 2010.

Nevertheless, the Court

failed to consider and assess the scope of the gain to be
enjoyed by the Howes, in ascertaining whether a forfeiture
would bring about an excessively disproportionate economic
dislocation.

Instead, the Court improperly compared apples to

oranges by purporting to "offset" the unascertained value of
the Howes* reversionary interest, against the value of the
Manivest leasehold.

(Add No. 3 to Manivest's opening brief,

P. 7.)
At page 45 of their brief, the Howes concede in effect
that they could not prove "numerical damages" but go on to
baldly assert that "the fact of great harm to the Howes is
established" (emphasis in original).
to the Howes?

What is this "great harm

The only discussion of it is at pages 20-21 of

their brief:
1.

Underground storage tanks and health and safety

violations allegedly "exposed the Howes to severe

11/

Contrary to the suggestion in the Howes' brief, although
Manivest disagrees with the finding that the leasehold
had a present value of $500,000-$600,000, using a
discounted cash flow analysis, Manivest does not appeal
from that finding.

liabilities."

However, the Howes presented no evidence that

any such claims were asserted against them by governmental
agencies or otherwise.

Moreover, these alleged defaults were

first raised at trial, when it was too late for Manivest to do
anything about them.
2.

While the Howes also claim potential harm from

the alleged encroachments, they do not address Manivest's
argument that they didn't own the property subject to the
alleged encroachment.

Again, this alleged default was also

first raised at trial, as was the alleged assignment to the
Manivest Liquidating Trust.
3.

The Howes concede that there was no evidence that

their predecessors-in-interest would not have entered into the
lease if they could have forseen the alleged defaults.
However, the Howes suggest that this Finding of Fact "was
another way of saying that the defaults were material."
begs the question.

This

The Howes' reliance on similar unsupported

conclusory adjectives used by the trial court, e.g. 'material
breaches,' 'substantial nature,' 'primary importance', suffers
from the same infirmity.

Calling a breach material does not

make it so.
4.

The Howes also argue that they were "harmed" by

their own refusal to accept rent after giving notice of
termination, and by the attorneys' fees and costs they incurred
as a result of their own decision to file suit.

The paucity of

these arguments is self evident.
5.

Whether "[t]he condition of the property was a

source of concern to the Howes" or, just as subjectively, "they

considered the defaults to be material" is irrelevant.
Forfeiture cannot be based upon the whims of the Howes.
6.

Finally, at page 21 of their brief, the Howes

rely upon the "[t]ime is of the essence" provision in the
lease, and unabashedly misrepresent the record by stating that
"all of the defaults persisted long after notice and a
reasonable opportunity to cure" (emphasis added).

As discussed

above, most of the alleged defaults were not the subject of any
notice or opportunity to cure and were first raised at trial.
Thus, in response to the Howes' query at p. 21: "Why didn't
Manivest just take care of them?", Manivest asks: Why wasn't it
given any opportunity to do so, if these purported defaults
were so important to the Howes?

The answer is clear.

The

Howes didn't want "cures", they wanted the property.
Contrary to the Howes' arguments and the trial court's
findings, Manivest did not simply ignore the default
allegations that were the subject of the March 30, 1988
notice.

Larry Leeper promptly responded by letter dated

April 1, 1988 (Trial Ex. 30), properly disputing the contention
that the Howes' consent was required for the pledge of the
lease to Valley Bank as security for financing.

This position

was later reaffirmed by Manivest's legal counsel.
32).

(TriaL Ex.

Mr. Leeper's April 1 letter further indicated that

maintenance issues would be addressed.
In sum, Manivest invites this Court to scrutinize the
record in search of defaults that would justify termination of
a 50-year ground lease at midterm, without adequate notice or

opportunity to cure, and the transfer to the Howes of
$2,000,000 in tenant improvements and more than half of a
million dollars in discounted cash flow.

No such defaults can

be found.
III.
THE HOWES* INTERFERENCE WITH MANIVEST'S FINANCING
FROM VALLEY BANK VIOLATED THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING, AS ALLEGED IN MANIVEST'S
COUNTERCLAIM.
The Howes violated the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in two ways.

First, they wrongfully contended

that their consent was required for use of the lease as
security for the financing from Valley Bank.
their consent was not required.

As shown above,

Second, they wrongfully

withheld that consent for an improper purpose, i.e., to force
renegotiation of the lease, specifically the amount of the
rental.

Accordingly, the trial court also erred in dismissing

Manivest's counterclaim.
At page 27 of their brief, the Howes state: M[T]here
is no factual support for the argument that the Howes objected
to the transfers to obtain increased rents."
omitted.)

(Footnote

Then, at pp. 36-37, the Howes provide the allegedly

missing support:

"The practical consequence of this structure

was that the parties would be required to negotiate if either
wanted to use its respective interest for financing purposes
other than for the original improvements."
omitted.)

(footnote

What would be the subject of these negotiations?

The answer is found in footnote 36 to the last quoted sentence,
where the Howes complain that "there were no percentage rents
and no cost of living adjustments."

This Court has held that there is an implied covenant
not to withhold consent unreasonably.

Elm, supra, at 649 P.2d

825 also stands for the proposition that where a contract
requires the consent of one party before the second party may
act (whether it be consent to a lease pledge or to any other
act) the first party ". . . has no right to withhold
arbitrarily his approval; there must be a reasonable
justification for doing so."

Id.

(Citations omitted, emphasis

added.)— '
The Howes also argue that Manivest in effect waived
the right to demand that the Howes act reasonably, by pledging
the lease to Valley Bank before requesting their consent.
argument dispatch this claim.

Two

First, Manivest correctly

believed that the Howes' consent was not required.

Their

consent was sought only at the urging of Valley Bank, as a
precautionary measure.

Second, since the Howes intended to

condition their consent on renegotiation of the lease, any
advance request to the Howes would have been futile.
While both the Howes and the trial court accused
Manivest of bad faith, it is the Howes, not Manivest, that wear
the black hats here.
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The Howes present a novel "choice of law" argument at p.
28 of their brief. One must not only look to the place
of contracting, but also to the status of the emerging
case law at the precise instant in time when the contract
is consummated. Suffice it to say that the Howes cite no
authority for such a rule of law. Also, the Howes'
attempt at p. 31, n.32, to distinguish Campbell v.
Westdahl, 715 P.2d 288 (Ariz. App. 1985) on the basis
that the landlord there "blatantly withheld consent to
(Footnote continued on next page)

IV,
IN THE EVENT THE FORFEITURE CLAIM IS NOT DISMISSED,
MANIVEST IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL FREE FROM
THE TAINT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRORS.
Even if the forfeiture claims survive the foregoing
arguments, Manivest is at least entitled to a new trial.

In

Jack B, Parson Construction Co. v. State of Utah, 72 5 P.2d 614
(Utah 1986) (as amended on rehearing), this Court's initial
opinion ruled that the trial court had committed numerous legal
errors, but affirmed the judgment against the plaintiff based
on the trial court's findings of fact, to which this Court
deferred.

On plaintiff's petition for rehearing, this Court

withdrew that opinion and issued an amended opinion ordering a
new trial. At p. 618, the amended opinion indicated that
because this Court could not determine the extent to which the
trial court's factual findings were infected with its legal
errors, a new trial would be necessary.
Here, as in Parson, it is impossible to determine the
extent to which the trial court's individual errors tainted its
ultimate decision.

For example, Finding No. 25 indicates that

the trial court relied upon " . . . particularly the breaches
regarding assignments, encumbrances and other related lease
terms . . ."as the material defaults justifying forfeiture.
If some or all of these alleged assignments or encumbrances

(Footnote continued from previous page)
transfer the lease in order to charge additional rent . .
." is similarly misplaced, given the identical position
taken by the Howes here.

were not defaults, or lacked necessary accompanying notice and
opportunity for cure, would any remaining defaults have been
sufficiently material that the trial court would have awarded
forfeiture?

The only way to tell is through a new trial.

V.
THE TRIAL COURT ALSO ERRED IN AWARDING THE HOWES
ATTORNEYS1 FEES AND COSTS.
The Howes argue that their claim for attorneys' fees
and costs lives or dies by the terms of paragraph 25 of the
lease.

However, paragraph 25 defines "costs" to include

attorneys' fees.— x

Accordingly, both the attorneys' fees

and the other "costs" sought by the Howes were governed by the
requirements of Rule 54(d)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
including the mandatory requirement of a timely bill of costs.
The Howes' cost bill was untimely.

Thus, even if the Howes

prevail on the merits, the award of attorneys' fees and other
costs must be reversed.J-±/
At page 48, the Howes argue they are entitled to
attorneys' fees and costs, even if the judgment is
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" . . . The defaulting party shall pay all costs and
expenses, including a reasonable attorneys' fee, which
may arise or accrue from enforcing this Agreement, or in
obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or
in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder . . .".
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The Howes' brief also demonstrates that the amount of the
award was excessive. At p. 47, n. 39 and p. 49, n. 43,
the Howes indicate that the fees awarded included those
in defending against Valley Bank's motion to intervene.
Those fees are beyond the scope of paragraph 25.

reversed.—'

This is untenable.

Even if one or more of the

default findings is affirmed, reversal of the forfeiture means
that the award of attorneys' fees must also be reversed.
Forfeiture was the only remedy sought by the Howes. Upon
reversal, they will not have succeeded in "enforcing" the
lease, "obtaining possession" or "pursuing any remedy provided
hereunder".

To the contrary, Manivest will have succeeded in

"enforcing" its rights under the lease, such as the right to
make the assignments complained of by the Howes, or will have
succeeded in "obtaining possession of the premises".

Thus, it

will be Manivest, not the Howes, that will be entitled to
attorneys' fees and costs, both in the trial court and on this
appeal.
VI.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE ON
THE ISSUE OF STRUCTURAL MAINTENANCE OF THE
IMPROVEMENTS.
At trial, the lower court ruled that the tenant's
maintenance responsibilities under paragraph 5 were unambiguous
and only applied to the property as it existed in its
unimproved state at the time the lease was consummated.

In

their cross-appeal, the Howes argue that even though $2,000,000
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Even according to the Howes' theory, at best, attorneys'
fees would have to be prorated between the default
allegations upon which the Howes prevailed, and those
upon which they failed. This would be impossible to do
from the affidavits of fees submitted by their counsel.
Also, the reliance at page 50 note 46 of the Howes' brief
on "current practice" regarding these affidavits is of no
avail if this practice fails to comply with the rules of
evidence.

in tenant-funded improvements have already been made, Manivest
was in default for failing to expend an additional $350,000 for
structural roof and parking lot repairs.

Again, these

allegations of default were not the subject of any notice or
opportunity to cure.

Also, the evidence proffered by the

HowesJ-§-/ was irrelevant because it pertained not to the
status of the property as it existed prior to the May 31, 1988
termination notice, but to the status of the property in 1989
and 1990.
The thrust of the Howes' argument is that because the
original parties to the lease contemplated that the tenant
would build a shopping center, and because the lease is a "net"
lease, the tenant is required to make massive structural
improvements, even though there is no such specific requirement
expressed in the lease.
points.

However, this argument overlooks two

First, the lease did not require that the shopping

center be built, but only gave the tenant the option to do so.
The property could have remained unimproved.

Second, even a

"net" lease does not bind the tenant to make structural
repairs, absent an express and specific lease term requiring
such repairs.
Mobil Oil Credit Corp. v. DST Realty, Inc., 689 S.W.2d
658 (Mo. App. 1985) involved the lease of an eight-story office
building, the lower three floors of which constituted a parking
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In addition to the Howes' proffers, much of the evidence
on the maintenance issues came in through the back door,
on the "health and safety" issues.

garage.

The landlord contended the tenant was required by the

lease to fund the cost of over $400,000 in structural repairs
to the parking garage.

The lease was a long-term (10 years

with an option to extend for an additional five years) "net"
lease containing general requirements for the tenant to
maintain the premises and make all repairs.

However, the lease

did not specifically address the structural repairs at issue,
and the Court held that this was fatal to the landlord's claim.
The court first noted the general rule that M. . . a
tenant cannot be held for substantial structural repairs unless
it so specifically agrees in the lease. A general covenant of
a tenant to make ordinary repairs does not require him to make
structural repairs."

689 S.W.2d 660 (citations omitted).

The

court rejected the landlord's argument that a "net" lease
necessarily requires the tenant to make such repairs "because
of what it is called rather than what it does".
omitted).

Id., (citations

"The . . . portions of the lease defining a 'net1

lease . . . cannot be used to create a promise to make the
present repairs."
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Id., (citations omitted) .—y

Mobil Oil applies with even greater force here, because,
unlike Mobil Oil, the improvements here were originally
constructed by the tenant rather than the landlord.
Thus, paragraph 3 of the lease here provides that these
improvements " . . . shall remain the property of the
Lessees so long as this Lease remains in full force and
effect." Certainly Manivest retained discretion
regarding structural maintenance of its own property,
especially where the Howes' reversionary interest in that
property would not have come to fruition (absent
premature termination) for over 25 years.

Moreover, the Howes' position on Manivest's
responsibility to fund hundreds of thousands of dollars in
structural repairs is at odds with its position on use of the
lease for tenant financing.

How was Manivest to fund these

repairs without using the lease as security for financing
them?

Once again, the Howes manufactured a default that

couldn't be cured by requiring Manivest to make structural
repairs, while depriving Manivest of the ability to finance
those repairs.
CONCLUSION
Ironically, in the conclusion to their brief at p. 54,
the Howes focus on the equities:

" . . . [A] party which

invokes equity . . . must demonstrate that it comes with clean
hands.

Equity does not protect one who has been

unfair . . . ".

However, these principles apply not just to

parties seeking to avoid a forfeiture, but to parties seeking
to cause a forfeiture as well.

It is the Howes, not Manivest,

who come to court with unclean hands, and who have acted
unfairly.

The equities require that the judgment of forfeiture

be reversed and the lease reinstated, or at least that a new
trial be held.
DATED this 16th day of July, 1991.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

5s A. Boevers
Atifcp^neys for Defendants and
Appellants
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March 30, 1988

CERTIFIED MAIL
Mr. Larry K. Leeper
Professional Manivest, Inc.
255 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

South Lake Shopping Center

Dear Larry:
I am writing you on behalf of the current lessors
pursuant to that certain Lease and Option Agreement dated October
14, 1960 first made by and among Earl E. Howe, Vivian Howe,
John 0. Howe and Maxine Howe, as Lessors, and J. E. Lehnherr,
Herman L. Franks and Stanford L. Hale, d/b/a Valley Shopping
Center, as Lessees (the "Lease").
It is our position that Manivest, as the successor
to the Lessees, is in default of covenants in the Lease, including
but not limited to the following:
1.
The covenant to keep the premises free and clear
of all liens and encumbrances;
2.
The covenant not to
our prior written consent; and

assign

the

Lease

without

3.
The covenant to maintain the premises and
keep them free from weeds and other obnoxious growth.

to

For example, Manivest*s letter of January 22, 1988
failed to disclose that on January 5, 1988, Manivest encumbered
the premises by recording a Trust Deed and Assignment of Rents
and by filing a Financing Statement in favor of Valley Bank
and Trust Company.
These encumbrances and Manivestfs attempt
to conceal them from us constitute flagrant violations of the
Lease. Moreover, without seeking our "prior" consent, Manivest
assigned its leasehold interest to Valley Bank and Trust Company

ADD. "A"

Mr. Larry K. Leeper
March 30, 1988
Page 2
on December 8, 1987.
Furthermore, we recently inspected the
shopping
center
and
discovered
that
there
are
piles
of
Christmas-time trash and last year's crop of obnoxious weeds
still located on the Premises, and that the surface of the parking
lot is not and for some period of time has not been in good
order or repair.
Based upon these defaults, it is our position that
we are entitled to terminate Manivest's rights under the Lease.
At this time, I am also forwarding a transmittal letter
and four checks which Salt Lake County recently sent to Robert
E. Howe and me.
Apparently, these checks represent the 1987
property taxes refunded as a result of the appeal which Manivest
filed with the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization.
The
checks are as follows:
Check
Check
Check
Check

No.
No.
No.
No.

29065 — $
872.72
29066 — $ 2,908.95
29068 — $
727.25
29067—$10,035.95

Robert E. Howe and I have both now had the opportunity to endorse
these checks to Manivest.

GMS/pmn
^~
Enclosures
cc: Mr. and Mrs. John 0. Howe
Mr. and Mrs. Robert E. Howe
Mr. and Mrs. William K. Evans

GERRIT M. STEENBLIK
Two North Central Avenue
Phoenix, Arizona 85004
(602) 262-5846

April 29, 1988

CERTIFIED MAIL—RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
Mr. Larry K. Leeper
Professional Manivest, Inc.
255 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

South Lake Shopping Center

Dear Larry:
We have considered your letter dated April 1, 1988,
and, to say the least, we are very disappointed.
"Running your
business" does not give you the right to jeopardize ours.
But for the single first mortgage referred to in
paragraph 14 of the Lease, there is no justification whatsoever
for the Valley Bank loan.
Notwithstanding statements to the
contrary in your April 1st letter, the Valley Bank loan clearly
is intended to and does affect our position as lessors. Among
other
things,
the
Assignment
of
Lease
and
accompanying
Acknowledgement which you sent us on January 22, 198 8 asked
us to agree that
(1) Manivest

had

the

right

to

assign

the

Lease

to

the bank;
of the
Lease;

(2) the bank would be entitled to succeed to possession
leased premises and to exercise all rights under the

(3) the bank would be entitled
any claim or default; and
(4) Manivest
in the property.

was

thereby

to 15 days notice of

encumbering

our

interest

Moreover, the form of the deed of trust as recorded demonstrates
your intent to encumber our interest, not merely yours.

Mr. Larry K. Leeper
April 29, 1988
Page 2
In our opinion, you are being less than candid to
suggest that this kind of borrowing is in the_"ordinary course"
of your business, or that it "does nor affecz the lessor's
position," or that "the assignment is only for security purposes."
The existing encumbrances and Manives-'s attempt to conceal
them are flagrant violations of the Lease.
On behalf of the lessors, I hereby advise you that
time is of the essense and that we insist upon strict performance
of all of the covenants, restrictions and conditions in the
Lease.
Very truly v^rs,

GMS/pmn
cc:

Mr. Robert E. Howe
Mr. John D. Howe
Ms. Carole Evans

RAY, O U I N N E Y & N E B E K E R
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
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May 31, 1988
CERTIFIED MAIL AND PROCESS SERVER
Mr. Ernest C. Psarras
Professional Manivest, Inc.
255 East 400 South, S^aite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

South Lake Shopping Center

Dear Mr. Psarras:
This law firm represents the current lessors pursuant
to that certain Lease and Option Agreement dated October 14,
1960, first made by and among Earl E.-Howe, Vivian Howe, John
0. Howe and Maxine Howe, as Lessors, and J. E. Lehnherr, Herman
L. Franks and Stanford L. Hale, d/b/a Valley Shopping Center,
as Lessees (the "Lease"). It is our understanding that Professional Manivest, Inc. ("Manivest") is the successor to the
Lessees.
OUR CLIENTS HEREBY GIVE FORMAL NOTICE THAT THE LEASE
IS TERMINATED EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY UPON YOUR FIRST RECEIPT OF
THIS LETTER.
It is our clients1 position that Manivest has breached
several covenants of the Lease, including but not limited to
the following:
1. The covenant to keep the premises free and clear
of all liens and encumbrances whatsoever;
2. The covenant not to assign the Lease without
the Lessors1 prior written consent; and

Mr. Ernest C. Psarras
Professional Manivest, Inc.
May 31, 1988
Page two

3. The covenant to maintain the premises and to keep
the premises free from weeds and other obnoxious growth.
The Lease provides an express forfeiture provision.
Pursuant to paragraph 9, the Lease is automatically terminated
upon Manivest1s failure to keep any covenant for a period of
60 days. The Lease expressly provides that there is no requirement for notice, and it does not grant any opportunity for cure.
Notwithstanding these terms, our clients have given
Manivest every reasonable opportunity to remedy these breaches.
By letters dated March 30, 1988 and April 29, 1988, they formally
demanded that Manivest comply with its obligations. By ignoring
these demands, Manivest has left our clients with no alternative
but to declare the Lease to be terminated and to retake possession of the premises.
Pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Lease, you are hereby
instructed to surrender possession of the premises to our clients
by promptly delivering to this law firm all necessary keys and
operating documents pertaining to the premises. Our clients
hereby formally assert their right to take possession of the premises and to lease the space for their own behalf.
Since our clients became aware of the foregoing breaches
of the Lease they have not accepted or negotiated any rent checks.
In connection with the termination of the Lease, our clients
are prepared to, and do hereby, tender return of all such rent
checks to you; provided, however, that such a return of rent
checks does not constitute a waiver of our clients' right to the
reasonable rental value of the premises after the date of default
and termination. Please advise me as to where these checks
should be delivered.
Very truly yours,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Larry G. Moore
LGM/dd

